(De)constructing difference: a qualitative review of the ‘othering’ of UK Muslim communities, extremism, soft harms, and Twitter analytics by Carter, Denise Maia.
For Peer Review Only
 
 
 
 
 
 
(De)Constructing Difference: A Qualitative Review of the 
‘Othering’ of UK Muslim communities, Extremism, Soft 
Harms, and Twitter Analytics 
 
 
Journal: Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 
Manuscript ID Draft 
Manuscript Type: Original Theoretical Article 
Keywords: Twitter, ‘Othering’, Terrorism, community, Radicalisation 
  
 
 
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rirt
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression
For Peer Review Only
 
 1 
 (De)Constructing Difference: A Qualitative Review of the ‘Othering’ of UK Muslim 
communities, Extremism, Soft Harms, and Twitter Analytics 
 
Abstract   
There is some evidence that, in the UK, current counter terrorism initiatives reproduce and amplify 
both real and imagined differences between Muslim and anti-Muslim groups, leading in turn to social 
and community polarisation and isolation. It is far from clear whether these changing perceptions 
always lead to increased ethnic and religious violence or increased radicalisation. However, more 
worrying is the potential for the development of ‘soft harms’ among those ‘suspect communities; for 
example reduced social integration, withdrawal from British cultural life, hate crime, forced marriage 
and domestic violence. There has to date been little interrogation of the scale of ‘soft harm’ among 
Muslim communities. Within this paper, the author offers a qualitative review of how the Muslim 
‘other’ has become an ascribed category reproduced through an endemic ‘Mulsim common sense’. 
Following that the author suggests that Twitter analytics may be harnessed to analyse the attitudes, 
current condition, and reactions of suspect other communities through the tweeting of everyday 
events. The aim in doing so is to develop a series of proposals to counter the ideological 
underpinnings of difference and contribute to current debates on counter terrorism policy in the UK. 
 
Keywords: Twitter, ‘Othering’, Terrorism, Soft harm, Demographics, community, 
Radicalisation 
 
The main problem 
 
Taking an anthropological stance this paper suggests new ways of overlaying 
neighbourhood knowledge (e.g. crime statistics) with Twitter analytics in order to develop 
accurate representations of suspect communities and individuals. First the author 
examines some of the ways in which identity and community are constructed through 
everyday common sense understandings of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Muslim community’. Following 
this analysis the author looks at new ways of overlaying neighbourhood knowledge with 
Twitter analytics in order to develop accurate representations of suspect communities and 
individuals. The author suggests that the ‘othering’ of British Muslims is a key mechanism 
in dividing communities. Furthermore, it is a mechanism that can be uncovered by a more 
holistic UK counter extremism policy that brings together neighbourhood knowledge and 
Twitter analytics to focus on responding to more community based harms. Significantly, 
the practice of ‘othering’ is already recognised as a key component in understanding 
terrorism and counter-terrorist activity (Talbot 2008).  
 
Knowledge about ‘other’ and ‘Muslim’ and ‘suspect community’ and other issues are 
further situated within oppositional binaries that define us/other. As an identity 
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 2 
discourse, the practice of ‘othering’ is neither original nor a single, simple outcome of 
Muslim versus West relationships. Indeed othering has been a popular topic for 
anthropologists studying how Western Cultural assumptions privilege and reinforce the 
West as civilised, democratic and safe, while at the same time representing others as 
uncivilised, undemocratic and threatening (Said 1979). In effect ‘othering’ is a 
dehumanising exercise, as Dalby observes: 
Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a 
political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the 
vantage point of the person specifying the difference (1997: 19) 
 
This paper proposes that the process of othering ultimately leads to what the author calls 
a stigmatising ‘Muslim common sense’ through which our everyday knowledge about I/we 
and other is played out and performed on many levels, including political (as in UK counter 
terrorism policy); cultural (as in social and community polarisation and Islamaphobia); 
economic (as in poverty, welfare and employment); media – particularly Twitter (as in 
reproduction of popular discourses of Muslim). Most importantly the act of othering is an 
important manifestation of power relations and knowledge. Those power relations are 
exposed when ‘we’ define ourselves as part of a group, and construct the ‘other’ as 
fundamentally different and as ‘not belonging’ (Clifford 1986, Foucault 1986). Thus the 
process of othering is a social process that (re)produces inequalities. For Leach (1973: 772) 
the process of othering starts by emphasising how different the others are, and ends by 
making them ‘remote and inferior’. The author suggests that for British Muslims the 
process of othering ultimately causes stigmatization resulting in real harms both hard (e.g. 
violence) and soft (polarization). 
 
At the heart of this stigmatising process is a common sense definition of Muslim that is a 
fluid and subjective rather than objective category. It is important to recognise how this 
common sense definition of Muslim operates to reconstruct and perpetuate social 
difference. In other words as Morgan observed ‘in the global west the racialised muslim 
other has become the pre eminent folk devil of our time’ (2015:1). Where Morgan used 
moral panic theory (Cohen 2002) to explain how ‘Muslims equal terrorists’, this paper 
instead offers a qualitative review of the ways in which ‘othering’ leads to a stigmatising 
‘Muslim common sense’ that in turn structures understanding of and response to 
extremism. 
 
The political dimensions of othering 
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 3 
Social identity constructions are intricately connected to, and reproduced by political 
systems governing societies. It is a complex relationship in which the political apparatus 
identifies certain ideals and practices that inform its citizens how to live together and how 
to treat others (Hughes 2004). These ideological processes impact on, and help convey 
specific ideas and values that define the moral health of a nation and our understandings 
of us/the other (Larner 2010). This does not always have a positive effect, but can include 
negative feelings of fear, and dread as well as justifying inequalities between individuals 
and communities by constructing difference. Thus ascribed qualities such as ethnic, 
cultural or religious variation or difference become an accepted understanding of both our 
notions of ‘Britishness’ and ‘Muslim common sense’. 
 
This accepted understanding is further exacerbated by the current political climate that 
has seen right wing parties such as UKIP becoming more popular across Europe. The UKIP 
leader, Nigel Farage is seen increasingly to be speaking to people’s worries about 
immigration, low wages, NHS cuts and unemployment. In a recent debate on Brexit he 
warned that migrant rapists from Germany could be given the right to travel to Britain. 
And blamed the EUs open borders for allowing Jihadi terrorists the freedom to ‘roam 
around Europe’ and to target Britain. In January Zeronian (2016) reported the ‘German 
UKIP’ the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as rising in popularity on the back of the ongoing 
migrant crisis. In France Marine Le Pen leader of the National Front has also blamed the 
EUs open borders for jihadist migrants freely entering France to commit acts of terror. 
All of these things feed into an alarmingly us /them polarity, suggesting to people on the 
street that right wing anti Muslim views are acceptable. This positioning and othering of 
Muslim has been further normalised by the recent Brexit campaign and subsequent vote to 
leave the EU. In the weeks of uncertainty following the referendum, and consequential 
political upheaval we may see even more social and cultural polarisation and recognition 
that as a nation, the UK contains a number of communities with radically different values 
systems. Research appears to support this, with a recent YouGov poll (2016) finding 51% 
agreeing there is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society, and 
only 25% suggesting the two are generally compatible.   
The media coverage of the recent Orlando gay club massacre in June  (Lyons 2016) by a 
self-professed Islamist terrorist reconfirms Muslim homophobic views to an already 
convinced UK British population. This reconfirmation is enabled by the framing of the 
message. According to Goffman (1974), messages are produced, reproduced and 
understood through the frames created for us. Media (both mass and new) distribute 
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 4 
ideological messages using framing (Gitlin 1980) i.e. it is organised and presented in a 
particular way and that framing of the message impacts on the audience perception. 
Although the message may be fundamentally true, the truth may be somewhat different. 
For example, a YouGov poll by Ozanne (2016) showed that evangelical Christians (70%) are 
more liable than Muslims (47%) to be against same-sex marriages. 
Extremism is not a new problem. However, extremism has become something that 
increasingly occurs ‘here’ in the West rather than ‘out there’. Furthermore it is executed 
by the ‘other’ against ‘us’. The political dimension of terrorism in the UK is one context in 
which discourses of othering inform and define British Muslim and national identity. This is 
played out at state, popular and party political level in actions that redefine forms of 
solidarity and division in the UK through constant positioning of distrust of the Muslim 
other as terrorist or extremist. For example following a number of terrorist attacks in 
France and Germany in July 2016, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, the Metropolitan police 
commissioner has warned: 
Our threat level has been at severe for two years – it remains there. It means an 
attack is highly likely. You could say it is a case of when, not if (BBC News 31st July 
2016) 
In short, this has led to an acute awareness of danger or ‘public hyper vigilance’ (Jones 
and Smith 2002). The frequency and scale of terrorist attacks in the Western world by 
groups such as Islamic State (IS) has now become a constant worry for the individual in the 
street, whether travelling to work, shopping, watching sport, or going on holiday. We are 
encouraged to be a nation who constantly look over our shoulders and are suspicious of 
the person standing next to us. We have become hyper aware of the ‘other’ who might 
also be identified as the ‘enemy within’. Brown (2009: 103) among others (see also Earle 
2015) comments that states often use this particular rhetoric to frame Muslims as ‘other’ 
in a liberal discourse of tolerance; saying that citizens are called to support the state by a 
twofold argument: first encouraging a strong ‘us’ and second to be ‘hyper alert’ to the 
‘dangers in their midst’.  
This particular rhetoric is employed by a number of official bodies in the UK to encourage 
hyper vigilance. For example the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Hotline poster states: 
‘It’s probably nothing but… if you see or hear anything that could be terrorist-related trust 
your instincts and call the Anti-Terrorist Hotline on 0800 789 321’. The British Transport 
Police poster states: ‘don’t rely on others. If you suspect it, report it’. At the same time 
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 5 
suspicion is crystallised around particular others. As a result of this, there is some 
evidence that current counter terrorism initiatives not only nourish and magnify what 
Robert Eatwell (2006) called ‘cumulative extremism’; they also reproduce and amplify 
both real and imagined differences between Muslim and anti-Muslim groups, leading in 
turn to othering and social and community polarisation and isolation (Lean 2014, 
Mahamdallie 2007).  
The cultural dimensions of othering 
We must also acknowledge the wider cultural, social and political environment as meaning 
making (Berger & Luckmann 1991). There is a link between individual and societal 
knowledge, particularly everyday perceptions and common sense knowledge i.e. what 
individuals or societies take for granted as real. This is because common sense knowledge 
as a way of thinking does not require evidence and is rarely contested (Asad 1986). This is 
often played out in the media, and the lack of contestation is seen as inevitable by 
theorists and researchers like Gamston et al:  
The lens through which we receive these images is not neutral but evinces the 
power and point of view of the political and economic elites who operate and focus 
it. And the special genius of this system is to make the whole process seem so 
normal and natural that the very art of social construction is invisible (Gamston et 
al 1992: 374). 
In contrast Mills (1959) suggests that we use our ‘sociological imagination’ to question our 
everyday perceptions and common sense beliefs in order to change society for the better. 
The fundamental question for this paper is to ask how we can challenge the discourses of 
othering that inform and define British Muslim and national identity through constant 
framing and positioning of distrust of the Muslim other as terrorist or extremist. 
One problem is that our everyday perceptions and common sense beliefs are not only 
underpinned by evidence from the current UK counter terrorism strategy. With the 
increasingly mediatised nature of society this evidence is also produced and reproduced in 
many forms, continually perpetuating the flawed myth of ‘Muslim’ as other. Two recent 
reports looking at negative media coverage uncovered a ‘thematic pattern of linking 
Muslims and Islam with terrorism, violence, and orthodox ideals’ (Ahmed and Matthes 
2016:17); and that Islamophobia is advancing across the ‘political environment, media 
outlets, on streets and in business life’ of most European nations (European Islamophobia 
Report 2016: 1). These forms vary from print newspapers to online news sources and social 
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 6 
networking sites such as Twitter. Most days of the week a media story can be found that 
ascribes particular characteristics to Muslim, Muslim men and masculinity, Muslim culture 
and the treatment of women etc. 
At the same time a very powerful Jihadist narrative is being perpetuated by organisations 
such as IS. Corman et al identified three different frames of operation in the Jihadist 
narrative: legitimation, propagation and intimidation, and their increasing expertise in 
new communications media: 
Jihadis have an explicit communication and public relations strategy […] they are 
rapidly assimilating new media into their repertoire in hopes of establishing a 
worldwide virtual jihad movement (2006: 3) 
To date, a great deal of effort has been spent investigating this narrative by using 
predetermined search algorithms in order to identify jihadi messages on Twitter, Omer 
(2015) being a recent example. Consequently for us to succeed in promoting community 
cohesion and understanding, and to reverse the polarisation trend that is currently 
problematic for current counter terrorism strategy makers we need to evaluate the impact 
and meaning making around ‘Muslim’ and the othering of British Muslims. One way is to 
look at ‘Muslim’ as a floating signifier (Hall 1996). 
Identity construction refers to the mechanism by which the social identities of individuals 
and groups are maintained and (re)produced. Social identities can be both ascribed i.e. 
assumed at birth, or achieved. The latter is important here because it is an identity that is 
earned or chosen, and indicates both group membership and social and cultural identity. 
Because of these common sense beliefs and understandings we expect certain groups in 
society to act in certain ways, and these expectations guide our actions and reactions to 
individuals and groups. Omi and Winant (1995) discussed the notion of collective identity 
in terms of ‘racial common sense’ to describe the process by which individuals ascribe 
social meaning to both real and perceived differences, for example skin colour. Where 
Hall (1996) described race as a ‘floating signifier’ that is a category with cultural meaning, 
it might be a useful concept for examining how ‘Muslim’ is also a ‘floating signifier’. 
Deconstructing the meaning of “Muslim’ both within, and without the category itself could 
uncover some previously unknown assumptions that underpin the ideological construction 
of difference.  
In addition social identity is by no means a fixed phenomenon. It is a highly complicated 
and fluid process in which social identities are not always ascribed or achieved. The 
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 7 
signifying aspects of identity, for example ‘Muslim’ are both ambiguous and diverse AND 
are socially constructed and negotiated between social actors. Thus social identity is the 
result of a complex dynamic between the self and other, the self and community, the self 
and the nation etcetera (Bourdieu 1984, McDonald 2015). In part this ascribed social 
meaning is achieved by an ideological shift that allows individuals to disregard their own 
everyday knowledge and experiences in favour of those in ‘authority’. The big question 
then is who or what is that authority, and to interrogate that we need to deconstruct the 
individual and local world of meaning that informs our ‘Muslim common sense’ and 
constructs Muslim as ‘other’ and equates that with ‘terror’. As was stated earlier, many 
official bodies in the UK encourage this suspicion and hyperawareness. As a result, British 
Muslims have emerged as a perceived racialised threat. Worryingly this narrative also 
feeds into popular concerns about culture and Britishness, immigration, religion and 
terrorism (Ahmed and Matthes 2016, Brown 2009, Morgan 2015).  
The economic dimensions of othering 
Economic othering is nothing new. For example, anti-Semitic rhetoric during the Nazi 
regime framed the economic conditions of the Weimar Republic as the result of the 
nation’s minority Jewish population (Monhollen 2015: 71). Migration, refugees and 
immigration are perhaps some of the most contentious contemporary issues of recent 
years, and are a high priority of the continuing Brexit debate. Discussion around 
Britishness, employment, social welfare, the NHS, cultural differences and crime also 
figure highly. We can see from this Twitter example how anti muslim rhetoric is employed 
to frame the economic conditions of the UK as the result of the Muslim other: 
 
Muslims taking over UK: ‘Immigrants stealing our jobs 
http://linkis.com/rt.com/uk/260213-uk-/Mksym Amnesty & open door to 
immigration helps poor? #anon (Tweet anonymised) 
 
According to Atran (2015) Muslim immigrants in Europe are failing to achieve the levels of 
social, cultural and economic status they would like. As a result they are more likely to be 
poor and/or less educated. The charity Muslim Aid has suggested that these are ‘key 
factors’ driving crime in the UK. Figures from the Statistical Unit at the Ministry of Justice 
suggest the UK has about 5% Muslims yet they make up 20% of high-security prisoners, an 
increase of 24% from 2011 (Ministry of Justice 2015). This can lead to deep frustration 
among us/the other. Stern (2003) argues that in these situations religion can create links 
between a personal cause and the social and political goals of militant groups.  
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 8 
 
This in turn leads to soft harms that see increased radicalisation among those who become 
deeply frustrated. A number of theorists agree that these impressionable and frustrated 
individuals may be driven to join religious activists in order to ‘provide themselves with a 
sense of power’ (Juergensmeyer 2003: 187); that issues like these are ‘primary motivating 
factors in driving insecure, alienated and marginalised young men to join religious terrorist 
groups’ (Gunning and Jackson 2011: 373); and that these are groups vulnerable to being 
influenced by recruiters, radicalisers or Internet material (Hoffman 2006: 288). 
 
 ‘Dangerous groups’: The othering of Muslim communities 
 
The author is reluctant to frame the whole discussion of community polarisation in terms 
of simple opposing groups. Individuals do not have to be either vocal or to hold extreme 
views either as anti-Muslim protest groups or Islamic extremist groups in order to feed into 
and (re)produce our understandings of ‘Muslim’ and ‘suspect community’. In fact, it is 
important to understand how every individuals’ cultural, social and political environment’ 
frames their everyday understandings of ‘the self’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘suspect community’ and 
their relationships with others. Only then can we begin to comprehend both the ‘other’ 
and the enemy within, and develop strategies to both identify and counter both terrorism 
and extremism.  
Pantazis and Pemberton (2009: 649) suggested a definition of suspect community relevant 
to Muslim experiences in the context of the ‘war on terror’: 
[...] a sub-group of the population that is singled out for state attention as being 
‘problematic’. Specifically in terms of policing, individuals may be targeted, not 
necessarily as a result of suspected wrong doing, but simply because of their 
presumed membership to that sub-group. Race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender, 
language, accent, dress, political ideology or any combination of these factors may 
serve to delineate the sub-group.  
There is a long history of studying the effects of anti terrorist measures in the UK and the 
development of suspect communities. Those suspect communities that have become the 
main focus of the government's security agenda. Beginning with Hillyards (2009) notion as 
applied to the ‘irish’ terrorist, and more recently to Muslims as the new suspect 
community (Awan 2012, Pantazis and Pemberton 2009, Cherney and Murphy 2016). In 
effect Muslims come to be seen as not quite British. 
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 9 
 
Fears that ‘the ordinary person in the street’ do not know how to measure or see or be 
aware of terrorists are further concentrated by a powerful political discourse of fear of 
terrorism and counter terrorist protection methods. As individuals are called upon to be 
more suspicious and more untrusting of the Muslim ‘other’ the development of suspect 
communities solidifies. As more and more individuals are encouraged to be suspicious, so 
the Muslim community lose trust in education, the government, their neighbours etc. What 
is needed is a stronger research evidence base that helps us understand the effects of this 
‘othering’ on British Muslims. We already know that this ‘othering’ is achieved in a number 
of ways: beginning with the creation of ‘suspect communities’ where Islamic fanaticism 
and jihadi terrorism are increasingly seen as originating from particular communities. 
However, the perceived threat does not only come from communities but individuals and 
families in short – Muslim men. 
An investigation of ‘Muslim common sense’ reveals a flawed (and demonising) list of 
ascribed characteristics that often point to Muslim men as violent, dominant, patriarchal 
and oppressive. As such they embody Connell’s (2005) theory of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ 
subordinating and controlling their families. At the same time, a Western myth of the 
Islamic world as somehow backwardly religious and anti-scientific feeds into, and 
strengthens that ‘Muslim common sense’. In a very real sense Muslim men are increasingly 
demonised and sensationalised as ‘other’. Examples of this are easy to find in the media, 
where any Muslim narrative or news story is presented as an example of otherness. For 
example, Hopkins (2016) states authoritatively in the Daily Mail:  
‘White women are nothing to some Islamic and Arabic men. It's the reason our girls 
were abused in Rochdale and Oxford and the reason white German women were 
raped in Cologne’ 
Of course the qualifier in this piece is that only ‘some’ Islamic and Arabic men do not like 
white women. ‘Muslim common sense’ allows readers to ignore the word ‘some’ and to 
ascribe common characteristics to all Muslim men. In contrast researchers like Inhorn 
(2012) have found very different truths, saying most Muslim men want to find love in 
marriage and also want to experience the joys of parenthood. 
Unfortunately examples of this are also easy to find in academic literature, particularly in 
education where teaching non English speakers is often seen as problematic. For example, 
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 10
when talking about cultural dissonance, one of Sato and Hodge’s (2016: 274) respondents 
states: 
‘Sometimes with the Muslim students, I have seen that Muslim boys do not respect 
female PE teachers [...]. In their culture, they don’t respect women, I have seen it 
[…].’  
So we have a situation where this ‘othering’ and ‘demonising’ of Muslim men boys is 
widespread. As Muslim men are increasingly demonised and sensationalised as ‘other’, 
their masculinity and family values are more often called into question. Muslim 
immigration is identified as a threat, as for example by the English Defence League (EDL) 
who have a message that ‘identifies a new and supposedly existential threat to Europe: 
Islam and Muslim immigration’ (Meleagrou-Hitchens and Brun 2013).  
‘Dangerous masculinities’: The othering of Muslim men and their families 
Sensationalist media reporting about Muslim women’s rights, child sex and exploitation, 
honour killings, rape, forced marriage, family dynamics, freedom, control and segregation 
fuel the rhetoric of othering that reproduces Muslim as a racialised threat. More 
particularly Muslim masculinity is perceived as dangerous. This feeds in to more common 
sense understandings about masculinity generally, and the perceived innate aggression of 
young men. Tuffail (2015) argues that the development of the British Muslim as a 
racialised threat is a current and on-going process resulting in their marginalization. We 
can track much of this using Twitter hashtags. 
Twitter is an online social networking site that enables users to send and read short 150 
character messages called ‘tweets’.  In excess of 310 million people worldwide use 
Twitter although many more are registered but do not use it. Tweets are organized using 
the hashtag (#), a clickable link that is often attached to a word or phrase. Twitter, and 
hashtags in particular can be very useful for analysing social reactions and information 
flows in many instances. For example, Twitter’s use for the organising of (inter)national 
discussions on politics (Heverin and Zach 2010); the voicing of political dissent (Storck 
2011); the study of terrorism informatics (Chatfield et al 2015; Cheong and Lee 2011; 
Omer 2015). 
 
In effect Twitter has become the soapbox for the masses in which popular discourses and 
disproportionate representations of Muslim are reproduced. One such example is the 
hashtag #rapejihad. Whilst social media improves the power to share news and events and 
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 11
makes the world more open and connected, the incidence of racialised reporting appears 
to outweigh the non-racialised reporting. The very overt lexicon of the #Rapejihad hashtag 
screams at us about the dangerous Muslim men who prey on western women and girls, 
resulting in what Horsti  (2016) calls ‘digital Islamophobia’.   
 
Hence an investigation of the message domain around #rapejihad reveals the ‘truth’ about 
Muslim masculinity as dangerous through discussion of the paedophile rings in Rochdale 
and Rotherham, the auctioning of women sex slaves in Syria, honour killings etc. As well as 
positioning Muslim men as dangerous it also allows the dominant discourses to position 
Muslim women as powerless.  
 
British Muslim women are not powerless. Often highly educated, 25% of Muslim women 
aged 21-24 now have degrees, compared with 22% of Muslim men of the same age (Khattab 
2016). The political climate in which Cameron reproduced political ideologies earlier this 
year whilst reaching out to help integrate British Muslim women earned a fierce backlash 
using the Twitter hashtag #TraditionallySubmissive. Many women listed their achievements 
such as spearheading community, peace and inter faith initiatives. In fact Muslim women 
often keep their original surnames after marriage and one said ‘If I want to buy a burkini 
from M&S, I bloody well will’. 
 
‘Dangerous mothers’: Muslim women as terrorists 
In Islam terrorism is not only an act of men but also of women. Generally western 
audiences are in denial about the violent and military capacity of women. This includes all 
women, not only Muslim women who are often stereotyped as downtrodden victims, ‘we 
assume women are second class citizens and rely on the men to run the organisation’ (Ali 
2006: 21). Conventional western thinking about gender and violence makes the 
involvement of women in suicide bombings seem unbelievable.  
Women typically attract less security notice than men and achieve higher media coverage 
than men by a ratio of 8:1 according to Bloom (2007). It is thought that women now 
constitute at least 50% of all suicide bombers (Laster and Erez 2015: 84). This feeds into 
individual and societal unrest and fuels UK society’s hyperawareness of both the ‘other’ 
and the enemy within. No one is safe because they can be attacked at any time anywhere 
even by innocent looking women (Laster and Erez 2015: 89). Muslim again becomes 
synonymous with terror and the suspect community. 
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One outcome of an increasingly angry and disengaged Muslim community can apparently 
be seen in the recent ICM (2016) poll, carried out for Channel 4 news which alarmingly 
claimed only 34% of Muslims in Britain would inform the police about a terror plot. 
However, Miqdaad Versi, of the Muslim Council of Britain was less positive saying the poll 
was ‘skewed’ and ‘divisive’.  
 
Suspect communities cannot be defined or measured by terrorist acts alone. Muslim men, 
women and children from all walks of life populate suspect communities, most often 
innocently. The everyday common sense that informs us socially and culturally that they 
are not really British and as such will never be properly integrated is not the starting point 
for acceptance. Instead another approach is needed, one that looks deep into community 
and investigates ‘soft harms’ that may be perpetrated through this uneven racial 
narrative. Everyday life itself is a measure of extremism and this belief should be the 
starting point for integration and understanding. Muslim communities are not self-exiling, 
non-British enclaves.  The Muslim Council of Britain’s own research suggests there are far 
more serious concerns that relate to poverty, gender, criminality and Islamophobia. HM 
Government’s Prevent Strategy states (2011): 
6.22 But it is important not to overstate the relationship between radicalisation 
and community or individual isolation. We have also seen classified evidence that 
indicates very clearly that apparently well-integrated people have committed 
terrorist attacks. 
 
Terrorism informatics: tracking soft harms 
 
Where Twitter mining has previously been useful in terrorism response informatics this 
paper suggests a more fundamental use: to monitor the ongoing health of a community 
through aspects of Twitter informatics such as geographic profile, user demography and 
the broadcasting of everyday occurrences. In other words rather than studying the 
message domain we should be investigating the community domain. Using Twitter to 
track, locate, and assess the reaction to terrorist activities is nothing new. Indeed much 
time, effort and research has gone into the intelligence sharing and textual analysis 
techniques of this particular microblogging site (Ashcroft et al 2-15, Cheong & Vincent 
2010, Gupta et al 2015 and many more).  Tweets or Twitter messages have been shown to 
be a useful indicator of “sentiment and behaviour of the user base contributing to a 
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particular topic” (Cheong & Vincent 2010: 45). The author proposes that it is also possible 
to track soft harms in the same way. 
 
Soft harms are subjective in that they cause distress to some but not all, for example 
reduced social integration, withdrawal from British cultural life, hate crime, forced 
marriage and domestic violence. Clancy (2011) describes soft harms as involving the 
infliction of  ‘ some type of injury to morality affectivity or a systemic concern with the 
safety of individuals and the integrity of property’. They are distinct from hard harms that 
relate to offenses such as terrorist attacks, rape, murder and other serious offences. Hard 
harms affect all individuals in the same way. Using Twitter analytics overlaid onto local 
offline community knowledge should uncover the strength of the relationship between 
children and young people not prepared for life in the UK, and the soft harm of decreased 
social integration. Interventions could be developed to prevent soft harms morphing into 
hard ones and resulting in increased polarization, othering of suspect communities and 
increased acts of terrorism. 
 
Studying the community domain will provide new opportunities to assess the mood of 
communities and to augment more traditional terrorist monitoring. Existing monitoring of 
the jihadist and terrorist narrative will only uncover particular ‘problem’ individuals and 
feeds in to our othering of Muslim communities. In contrast the author suggests these do 
little to represent the community as a whole, and obscure more profound problems of soft 
harms that the UK Government should address. Shifting investigations to encompass the 
disenfranchised unheard Muslim voice will enable us to challenge current constructions of 
social and cultural problems and lead to new solutions. 
The user domain reveals aspects of individuals’ user identity, including details of who the 
user follows, and their profile. This can be ascertained by studying follower/following 
relationships, targeted replies, hashtags to group tweets, re-tweeting etc. As mentioned 
earlier, hashtags have been adopted by users as a way of categorising messages. Tweets 
are said to be ‘trending’ when they become popular on Twitter, being retweeted and 
quoted in large numbers. This usually indicates a spike in a discussion about a person or an 
event. Terrorism informatics often study these trends following a person or an event like 
#rapejihad and #TraditionallySubmissive mentioned earlier. 
In an increasingly mediatised world, digital media have become central to the 
construction of the identity and visibility of the self. Individual identity consists of several 
fragments constantly in a state of fluidity, a life-long developing and conceptualised 
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patchwork. How users actually use Twitter has brought about some changes resulting in 
more complex social interactions and networking structures.   
Twitter serves as one platform for individuals to express and refine their sense of identity, 
a key stage in adolescent development. This sense of identity unfolds both online and 
offline co-dependently.  It is thought that children and young people see Twitter as a 
space to cope with everyday stresses and challenges in their offline lives. As such, 
addressing Twitter use as well as more mundane neighbourhood information gathering 
processes may help us identify those stresses and challenges. This is particularly useful in 
developing strategies to depolarise or reintegrate those suspect communities that we 
already know.  
 
Knowledge about neighbourhoods and communities are generally easily found within local 
government, education, hospitals, social workers, and community policing offices. Digital 
technologies such as Twitter may be just as important a contributor to local knowledge, 
particularly in identifying incidences of soft harm. There has already been some 
recognition of this by the UK police. The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA 
2010) report suggested using digital media as a way of supporting and improving 
neighbourhood policing. However, according to Crump (2011: 23) police use of social 
media in the UK has been fairly limited so far. Although intended to communicate and 
engage with the public, actual two-way communication had been largely non-existent and 
“non-transformational”.  This changed following the August 2011 riots in the UK when 
digital media were used more widely to gather evidence.  
 
This paper proposes that Twitter analytics, combined with traditional datasets will 
facilitate a number of outcomes: first, to engage with ‘other’ communities more 
explicitly; second, using digital media to identify and monitor the extent of soft harms; 
third, to allow direct targeting of resources in order to address soft harms and the possible 
polarisation of communities; and last, to address the making of the ‘Muslim other’ and 
Islamaphobia at local, micro levels of society. 
 
The Proposed framework: Merging traditional data and Twitter analytics 
 
A major and long running criticism regarding the use of Twitter analytics in social science 
research is the lack of demographic information explicitly attached to the message 
domain. Traditionally search algorithms are predicated upon particular words and phrases 
with little or no context. Searches are made, parameters are drawn and outliers or ‘noise’ 
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are discounted. However, Sloan et al (2013) maintain that demographics and community 
information is very much present. As well as analysing message texts using sentiment 
analysis, the computational treatment of opinion, sentiment, and subjectivity in text (see 
Dodds & Danforth 2010) they suggested various techniques for establishing or estimating 
demographic data from message samples that incorporated sentiment analysis. 
 
By assigning sentiment scores to messages, Sloan et al (2013, 1.2) were able to cross 
reference “with other variables of interest, e.g. geo-location, types of event and gender”. 
Especially interesting to this author is the ability to collect and cross tabulate 
geographical information, and this was done in three ways: from the user profile, from 
geo-tagged tweets and from the content of the Tweets themselves. 
 
The profiles of users were successfully mined for geographical data for over 50% of 
Tweets. Impressively Sloan et al were able to locate the country for 52% of users, the 
state for 43% of users, the county for 36% of users, the city for 40% of users and the 
postcode for 10% of users. Using a small subset (n=100) from a larger data set of Tweets 
(n=500) following a keyword search for “muslim, mayor, London” I was successful in 
identifying the country for 49% of the Twitter users that I sampled from their profiles.  
 
The second method, comes from the Tweets themselves, geo-location and geo-tagging 
with latitude and longitude information is performed when Tweets are sent using mobile 
digital devices. Unfortunately due to increasing knowledge about privacy and surveillance 
(see for example Coleman & McCahill 2010) this selection is often switched off, and less 
than 1% of Sloan et al’s sample presented with geo tagging enabled.  
 
It has been proven possible to overcome this problem by inferring unknown users locations 
by examining their friend’s locations. This is based on the notion that online social ties are 
formed and produced across fairly short geographical distances.  While individuals tend to 
worry about geo tagging themselves they do not worry about retweeting, sharing and 
messaging friends. As a result it was recently possibly to correctly geotag over 80% of 
public Tweets from a sample size of 101,846,236 (Compton et al 2014). This was achieved 
using a sophisticated global optimization algorithm that is outside of the purview of this 
paper or the author’s expertise.  
 
Following the breadcrumbs 
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Instead the author made use of simple, readily available tools on the Internet to collect, 
collate and analyse found data (Hine 2011). Examples of these include Followthehashtag, 
a geo content analysis tool and TouchGraph, a graph visualization and social network 
analysis tool. As a qualitative researcher collecting rich contextual data I took as my 
starting point a single Twitter user identified by simply searching message content for a 
particular subject, in this case ‘birmingham and muslim’.  By following the trail of 
breadcrumbs beginning by investigating user profile, I was able to establish the gender, 
geographic profile, user demography and friend network in a this case. Looking at the 
broadcasting of everyday occurrences I began to build up an in depth picture of what is 
happening in that particular location.  
 
My proposal is that overlaying this information with more mundane neighbourhood 
information gathering processes including local schools, crime statistics and others will 
help us identify those stresses and challenges that lead to polarised, disenfranchised and 
stressed communities. This knowledge is paramount in developing strategies to depolarise 
or reintegrate communities.  
 
There are a ‘clear set of concerns’ (Sloan et al 2013, 6.1) for the collection and use of 
unobtrusive (Hine 2011) online and digital data. One concern is that without actual 
contact with those individuals and communities under study, how can we appreciate the 
meaning making behind their Tweets, retweets, likes, followers, and messaging etc. A 
second concern is of causing harm to individuals. The author argues that as part of a 
strategy (rather than a stand-alone method) to summarise findings across a particular 
community this method will uncover voices not generally heard, and allow us to both 
monitor the ongoing health of a community, challenge current constructions of social and 
cultural problems and develop new strategies for change. As Hine (2011: 3) quite rightly 
reminds us: 
Often these unobtrusive uses of Internet-derived data allow researchers to access 
something much closer to the experience of everyday life than we ever encounter 
in interview settings.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, I explored how identity and community are constructed through everyday 
understandings of ‘Muslim’ and ‘suspect community’. As an identity discourse, the 
practice of ‘othering’ privilege and reinforce the West as civilised, democratic and safe, 
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while at the same time representing ‘Muslim’ as uncivilised, undemocratic and 
threatening. Following this analysis the author looks at new ways of overlaying 
neighbourhood knowledge with Twitter analytics in order to develop accurate 
representations of suspect communities and individuals.  
 
The development of these methodologies and techniques in studying the community 
domain will provide new opportunities to assess the mood of communities and to expose 
more profound problems of soft harms that the UK Government should address. Of 
particular importance is overlaying this information with more mundane neighbourhood 
information. For example, identifying Tweets that use language related to soft harms such 
as for example reduced social integration, withdrawal from British cultural life, hate 
crime, forced marriage and domestic violence. The ability to link these tweets to a 
particular community allows us to not only ask new research questions but also to 
understand the mechanics of meaning making and othering that produce suspect 
communities. 
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